


# QE and rates

## Yields not very correlated with QE

*Fed security holdings, \$tn, vs US 10yr yield, %*




- Opinions deeply divided on the end of QE
- Treasury market impact has received most attention

**QE has had little obvious effect on bond yield levels...**

# QE and risky assets

## S&P correlates with QE


*Fed security holdings, \$tn, vs S&P 500*



Sources: CIRA, Federal Reserve, Bloomberg.

## Credit spreads correlate with QE

*Fed security holdings, \$tn, vs US credit spreads, bp*



Sources: CIRA, Federal Reserve.

**...but a significant effect on credit and equity prices**

# How it's worked

## Big QE purchases = Big market rally


*Weekly cumulative market performance since 2009 by size of Fed purchases of securities*

Gain in:	-- Weeks with purchases of: --	
	>\$10bn	<\$10bn
US BIG (bp)	-265	-46
S&P 500 (cum. %)	37%	6%
S&P 500 (points)	372	42
# of weeks	48	66

Source: CIRA, Federal Reserve, Bloomberg

## QE absorbed nearly all new US issuance

*Issuance (net of redemptions) minus QE purchases, UST + Corp + MBS + Agencies + ABS, \$bn*



Source: CIRA, Federal Reserve, SIFMA


**QE reduced net bond supply to almost zero**



# Where did all the money come from?

## More demand, same supply


Corporate mutual fund inflows vs net bond issuance, \$bn



Sources: CIRA, ICI.

## The money market pendulum

US mutual fund inflows by asset class, \$bn




Sources: CIRA, ICI. 2011 data are not annualized.

# Low rates are driving money into risky assets...

# How long will the inflows last?

## Risk appetite at record highs


*Investor holdings of long-term mutual funds,  
% money market fund holdings*



Sources: CIRA, ICI.

## HY and equities less stretched than corp

*Mutual fund investments by asset class,  
% money market fund holdings*



Sources: CIRA, ICI.

**High grade positions already very stretched;  
HY and equities less so**



# How value has changed

	S&P Forward P/E Ratio	High Yield Spread / YTW
Dec 2008	12.0x	2000 bps / 22%
Apr 2011	13.5x	480 bps / 7%

Source: Bloomberg. As of 4/21/11. Both December 2008 and April 2011 figures represent 1 month averages.

# Recent LBOs

	J.Crew	Del Monte	Jo-Ann
<b>Pre-Acquisition Valuation</b>			
<b>EV / 2011 EBITDA</b>	<b>5.5x</b>	<b>6.2x</b>	<b>5.0x</b>
<b>Date of LBO</b>	<b>11/23/10</b>	<b>11/25/10</b>	<b>12/23/10</b>
<b>Post-LBO Pro-Forma Leverage</b>			
<b>Net Total Debt / 2011 EBITDA</b>	<b>5.0x</b>	<b>6.5x</b>	<b>5.2x</b>

# Equity vs. corporate debt

Security	2011 EV/EBITDA	Leverage	FCF/Equity Market Cap	YTW
Gannett Co Equity	5.1x	1.7x	19%	
McClatchy Unsec Bonds		5.1x		9.0%
Macy's Inc. Equity	5.0x	1.5x	11%	
Michaels Stores Unsec Bonds		5.0x		7-7.5%
LifePoint Hospitals Equity	6.0x	2.6x	7%	
Vanguard Unsec Bonds		5.8x		8.5%
Iasis Unsec Bonds		5.7x		8.2%




# High yield premium below historical average

<b>Current Market Yield</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>Historical Default Rate x (1 - Recovery Rate)</b>	<b>=</b>	<b>Market Return</b>
<b>7%</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>4% x ( 1 - 30% )</b>	<b>=</b>	<b>4.2%</b>
		<b>7 Year Treasury Bond</b>	<b>=</b>	<b>2.8%</b>
		<b>High Yield Premium</b>		<b>1.4%</b>

# Excess returns are dependent on low default rates continuing

<b>High Yield Index 10 Year Annualized Return</b>	<b>=</b>	<b>8.4%</b>
<b>Forward Looking</b>		
<b>Assuming 2011E Default Rate (2%)</b>	<b>=</b>	<b>5.6%</b>
<b>Assuming Historical Default Rate (4%)</b>	<b>=</b>	<b>4.2%</b>
<b>Assuming Above Average Default Rate</b>	<b>=</b>	<b>??</b>


# Prime mortgage delinquencies






# Eleven million homes are still under water

Number of mortgages, millions



2010



Source: CoreLogic.

# The Nature of Credit


1. Credit is what counts, not leverage.
2. Most loans to real estate are not investment-grade.
3. Interest rates are volatile and unpredictable.
4. Credit research is more than ratings.
5. Sovereign debt is historically risky.
6. Debt values underpin all capital markets.

Fallacy:

“Any loan to real estate is a good loan ... ”




# The latest run-up of home prices was extraordinary



Sources: Robert Shiller, Milken Institute (Annualized growth rate of nominal home index: 3.1%)

# Home prices don't go up forever

Change in home prices in 120 years





# Most Texas Banks were AAA in the 1980s




First RepublicBank Corporation


*The prices of residential real estate in Houston (in real terms) declined 40% from 1983-1988.*

*- OFEHO Housing Index / FRB study*

# Foreclosures in Houston



# Annual U.S. Bank Failures 1979-2007



# When is a AAA not a AAA?

